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1 Introduction  
After experiencing financial crisis of 2007, economists realized that relying 
solely on monetary policy (MP) was not enough to maintain economic and financial 
stability. Under such circumstances, macroprudential policy (MPP) has emerged and 
became to be an important policy aimed on ensuring financial stability.  
The objective of this thesis is to make the assessment of the interaction between 
China's MPP and MP from 2007 to 2016 by using the related economic data and 
policy indicators.  
This thesis is divided into five parts. The first part intrudes the selected topic, 
and describes the aim of this thesis, its structure and the brief contents of each chapter. 
In the chapter 2 there is description of MPP and MP. We introduce the 
theoretical background about these two policies, further the policy instruments, 
evaluation and transmission channels in order to help us to understand the objectives 
of MPP, we also introduce and describe the concept of systemic risk. 
In the chapter 3, we describe the interaction between MPP and MP according to 
the background of their relationship, the interaction of the policy objectives and the 
interaction of the policy instruments. Based on this information, the proposals for a 
policy portfolio design are presented. 
In the chapter 4, we introduce basic information about implementation of 
China's MPP and MP. It includes the development of MPP in China, the double-pillar 
framework and the macroprudential assessment system (MPA). In addition, we 
characterize the China's so called steady MP, which conduction is different from other 
countries. Finally, we make the analysis of the interaction of MP and MPP in China 
based on the macro-economic variables such as gross domestic product (GDP) and 
inflation rate, and the policy tools, such as adequacy ratio, provision coverage and 
deposit reserves ratio. 
The last chapter is conclusion. In this chapter we summarize the results from 
the empirical part of the thesis and write the conclusions. 
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2 Characteristic of Macroprudential Policy and Monetary Policy 
It is important to study MPP and MP nowadays. MPP and MP are both 
important policies, which can influence financial stability. Especially after the global 
financial crisis of 2007, MPP became very useful to keep the safety and stability of 
financial system.  
In this chapter, we will introduce the basic information about MPP and MP, 
which include their framework, aims and instruments. This chapter consists of three 
sub-chapters; the first one describes MPP, the second part is focused on the MP, and 
the last part refers to systemic risks.  
2.1 Macroprudential Policy 
MPP aims to identify and mitigate risks for the robust stability of financial 
system, such as credit provision, insurance, payment and settlement services. The 
main goal of MPP is to limit systemic risk and work closely with other policies to 
help them accomplish their goals (Viñals, 2011). 
In the next five parts, we will describe the background, theoretical basis, 
objective, instruments and structure of MPP. 
2.1.1 Background of Macroprudential Policy 
     Macroprudential regulation is the approach to financial regulation that aims to 
mitigate risk to the financial system as a whole. In the aftermath of the late-2000s 
financial crisis, there is a growing consensus among policymakers and economic 
researchers about the need to re-orient the regulatory framework towards a 
macroprudential perspective (Krishnamurti, 2014). 
   As documented by Clement (2010), the term ‘macroprudential’ was firstly used 
in the late 1970s in unpublished documents of the Cooke Committee and the Bank of 
England (Li, 2013). But only in the early 2000s, after two decades of recurrent 
financial crises in industrial and, most often, emerging market countries, the 
macroprudential approach to the regulatory and supervisory framework has become 
increasingly promoted, especially by authorities of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). A wider agreement on its relevance has been reached as the result 
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of the late-2000s financial crisis. 
At the same time, MPP has gradually gone beyond the scope of financial 
regulation to form a MPP and has been used broadly to refer to policies that address 
systemic risk and all the topics related to the interaction of macroeconomic and 
financial stability (Li, 2013).  
   We have already known that the term “macroprudential” became important 
after the crisis of 2007, so if we want to know the reason why it is so, we should 
understand the causes of this crisis at first. 
 There are two main reasons, among others. The first one is the positive 
feedback characteristic of financial system, popularly speaking, it is the financial 
system’s procyclicality. For example, when people are trapped in an economic bubble 
and suffer from money illusion. Economic bubble means that the transaction price of 
capital exceeds its intrinsic value. The reasons for this are driven by many factors, 
such as the real value of the assets, or when people are optimistic about the future 
market due to information asymmetry or changes in government policies, asset prices 
will be pushed up and economic bubbles may generate. However, people will be 
aware of the existence of an economic bubble. When the bubble crashes, people fear 
to lose more money, they will sell assets, asset prices will fall and hurt the holders. 
However, good supervision will stop the process at some point of time, it prevents the 
occurrence of injury. In order to prevent financial crisis, we need to reduce the 
procyclicality of financial systems (Li, 2013). 
The second reason is related to the effect of systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs). These are the so called ‘too big to fail’ financial institutions. SIFIs 
are generally large and complex companies or banks that have a significant presence 
in the industry and are considered to require government regulation in order to avoid 
bankruptcy or insolvency. The bigger this type of company, the greater the damage 
done by its failure because such a company is connected to many other financial 
institutions, and has a lot of employees, which may lose their jobs and incomes. Thus, 
when the costs of help (bailout) are smaller than the loss caused by such a company's 
collapse, the government might provide an assistance. However, there are still many 
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open questions and problems related associated with this system. For example, how to 
define SIFIs? Do the SIFIs competitors need protection, those smaller banks? Who 
pays for the potential bailout of SIFIs, e.g. taxpayers? Will it create greater burdens on 
the people? More seriously, the SIFIs system may pose a serious moral hazard, reduce 
market discipline, and encourage more risky behavior. Both the SIFIs itself and the 
competitors of the SIFIs may make some inappropriate decisions because of the 
existence of SIFIs system (Kaufman, 2014). 
In the past, it was assumed that these financial crises would not emerge if the MP 
goals were met but after the crisis of 2007 people realized that even if there is a crisis 
in individual institutions, the risk may spread to entire financial system through their 
interconnectedness. At this point, MPP applies when MP is not sufficient to prevent 
systemic risks (Li, 2013). 
Nowadays, central banks of many countries use MPP to prevent the financial 
crises, and that is the reason why it makes sense to study MPP. 
2.1.2 Theoretical Basis of Macroprudential Policy 
Before the crisis in 2007, the theoretical basis of the mainstream financial 
supervision theory was new classical economics. 
     The focus of new classical economics is on the homo economics’ objective to 
maximize his/her personal utility. Based on this assumption the investors are always 
rational, the market is always efficient, and it will keep in Walrasian equilibrium all 
the time. What the financial supervision can learn from the new classical economics is 
that the supervision in financial markets should be minimized. The reason for this is 
that with the assumption of Walrasian equilibrium and rational economic agent, the 
signals from the market are always correct and effective, thus, market discipline can 
control for many risks.  
Moreover, we can use the market itself to eliminate those banks with potential 
problems, banks without potential problems will continue to operate. Financial 
institutions with a high level of risk management will not develop financial products 
that are overly risky, and consumers who have full access to information will only 
choose the product that best suits to them. The entire market can run perfectly (Li, 
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2013).  
     However, this theory is invalid in the real financial markets. Because the 
personal behavior of economic agents always cannot satisfy the hypothesis of their 
economic rationality. In this case, financial market is not always efficient. In fact, 
financial market fails to work efficiently in lot of times, due to the limited arbitrage 
effect, the market price of securities often does not reach a rational equilibrium level, 
and the effective market hypothesis is difficult to achieve (Barberis and Thaler, 2003).  
In addition, even though the personal behavior is rational, we cannot be sure 
that the financial market is rational as a whole, and we call this situation as ’fallacy of 
composition’. Fallacy of composition could be described as a situation when people 
see a part of a thing, they rely on the knowledge of what they see, and they assume 
that the whole thing is the same as this part. For example, a blind person wonders 
what an elephant looks like He/she went to touch an elephant, only touched the 
elephant nose, and asserted that the elephant is a very thick rope. 
Another reason why financial market might not be rational is the “herd effect”. 
Herding behavior could be described as a situation when people are easily influenced 
by other people around them and behave in a similar way. For example, if your friend, 
your family members or your neighbor tells you that some stock is a good investment, 
you may buy this stock without your own judgement, and think that this is the right 
behavior (Li, 2013). 
2.1.3 The Objective of Macroprudential Policy 
The MPP aims to ensure the stability of the financial system as a whole and to 
ensure that the financial sector makes a sustainable contribution to economic growth 
by strengthening the flexibility of financial system and by preventing and diminishing 
systemic risks. The objective of MPP consists of two parts: counter-cyclical and 
prevent systemic risks, and we will introduce systemic risk later. In other words, it 
addresses the time dimension and the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risks (Li, 
2013). 
When talking about the time dimension, systemic risk is extended by the 
interaction between financial system and real economy, which is pro-cyclical. There 
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could be a feedback effect between the financial system and real economy. When the 
economy is booming, the financial institutions' ability to take risks increases, 
increasing leverage and asset prices cause over-growth in the size of financial 
institutions' balance sheets. They can provide more credit and stimulate economic 
activity. When there is a bust of economic activity, financial institutions suffer from 
the credit losses, they are reluctant to grant new loans and their balance sheets shrink, 
making the downturn of economic activity deeper.  
To sum up, pro-cyclicality of financial intermediation could result in a greater 
amplitude of business cycle. Therefore, in the case of time dimension of systemic risk, 
the main objective of MPP is to curb the pro-cyclicality of financial system and to 
improve its resilience (Li, 2013). 
Regarding the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risks, the key question is 
how to deal with common and related risk exposures among financial institutions. 
These risks are usually due to the interconnectedness of business activities among fin 
institutions. As was mentioned earlier, there is a "fallacy of composition" in operation 
of the financial system.  
If there is some shock to financial system and first impacted institution emerged, 
it could decide to resist the shock by selling its assets. However, this approach 
becomes ineffective if all institutions decide to sell their holdings of assets as well. 
This could have negative effects on assets prices when the so-called fire-sell of assets 
causes sharp decline in their prices. 
Therefore, when the financial system encounters external shocks, systemic risks 
are easily triggered by the "herd effect". Therefore, from this perspective, we should 
try our best to keep such risks within a narrow range, especially the tail risk, by the 
way, we have better to explain what tail risk is, that is, some of the less frequent, but 
the impact of huge events. Because financial institutions are unable to withstand the 
damage caused by tail risk, we must take precautions regardless of the probability of 
tail risk occurring. 
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The risk of a cross-sectional dimension measures the cumulative risk in the 
financial system at a point in time; the risk in a time dimension measures the 
accumulation of risks within the system during some period and its eruption at some 
point (Wen, 2009). 
2.1.4 The Instruments of Macroprudential Policy1 
     In this part, we will introduce the instruments of MPP. Compared with 
micro-prudential regulation, macroprudential regulation focuses on the stability of the 
entire financial system. The main tools of MPP include six parts, we will introduce 
them one by one.  
• Regulation for liabilities maturity and capital liquidity 
After the financial crisis of 2007, people realized that they should not only pay 
more attention to the volume of liabilities of financial institutions, but also pay more 
attention to the duration of these debts because most of the liability, deposits and 
commercial bonds which quit were short-term when the global financial crisis 
occurred. This reduces the bank's ability to take and manage risks.  
In addition, in the event of a financial crisis, due to short-term investment 
withdrawals, banks that previously over-relied on short-term liabilities sold some 
assets in exchange for more funds, with multiple banks selling at the same time. This 
resulted in the substantial drop in asset prices. Thus, as the reaction, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision has set up the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), 
which requires banks to hold a certain amount of long-term debt in their capital 
structure. 
• Requirements for higher quality capital 
Compared with the preferred stock, when the company suffers a loss, the 
common stock will always be relied upon for compensation. The presence of a large 
number of preferred stock will make the common stock investor worried about taking 
the loss, and they could decide not to invest; therefore, it could be more difficult for 
company to issue the stocks. Therefore, the company needs to be required to hold a 
                                                             
1 The sub-chapter 2.1.4 is inspired by Li (2013). 
12 
 
certain amount of common stock, and in calculating the capital adequacy ratio, it 
needs to use some assets that can be converted into common equity.  
What needs to be mentioned is the Basel III Accord on capital adequacy 
requirements. This accord has raised the demand for capital adequacy but there are 
many factors that affect the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). There are four main 
aspects.  
Firstly, under the Basel Accords, the rise in the non-performing loans (NPL) 
ratio will increase the riskiness of assets of the banks, thereby reducing the capital 
adequacy of commercial banks, of course, if bank’ s total loans decline, the NPL ratio 
of this bank will decrease too, but they are the same in sense, it is the ability of loans 
supply of this bank is worse than past, so for a bank, pursue smaller NPL ratio is 
always right. 
   Secondly, higher profitability of commercial banks means that commercial 
banks can use more retained earnings to convert into capital. Thus, if the riskiness of 
assets does not change, the bank's CAR will be significantly raised.  
Thirdly, the bank's CAR will also change with the change in the size of assets. 
In China, state-owned commercial banks have higher capital adequacy ratios than 
other commercial banks (Li, 2013).  
Finally, there is an important role of economic cycle; in theory, the CAR of 
commercial banks and the business cycle is positively correlated. When the economy 
downturn, more borrowers are unable to repay the loan, the non-performing loan ratio 
rises, causing the CAR to drop. Due to regulatory requirements for the bank’s capital 
adequacy ratio, the declining CAR will reduce the bank’s credit supply and reduce its 
expansion capacity, aggravate economic recession (Wen, 2009). That why they are 
positively correlated 
• Focus on the amount of capital rather than the capital ratio 
For some banks with insufficient capital adequacy ratio, we should limit the 
remuneration of managers, prohibit the acceptance of interbank deposits and promote 
the bank to raise the CAR. However, some banks prefer to reduce the denominator of 
CAR, which represents the risk-weighted assets, instead of increasing the numerator, 
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i.e. acquiring more capital to meet the regulatory requirements for capital adequacy 
ratio. For such a bank, the higher amount of capital required will be more effective 
way how to rise CAR. Because our goal is to allow banks to guarantee its ability to 
supply credit and solvency, even if banks deleverage and reduce his risk assets, their 
ability to provide credit will decline too, so increase capital is the best way to rise 
CAR. 
• Regulation of shadow banking system 
Shadow banking refers to non-bank intermediaries that provide similar financial 
services to traditional commercial banks and has become a gray area of the financial 
environment. Sometimes it becomes the trick by which individual banks evade 
regulation and confuse investors. It included securitization vehicles, asset-backed 
commercial paper, money market funds, market for repurchase agreements, 
investment banks and mortgage companies (Bernanke, 2013). 
     Macroprudential regulation is different from the micro-level, and it is more 
concerned about the entire financial system; thus, the supervision and regulation of 
shadow banking activities is positive in the way that we can effectively avoid the 
existence of gray areas, but we can better achieve the policy objectives and stabilize 
the economy as well.  
• Contingent capital instruments 
Contingent capital instruments include reverse convertibles and contingent 
convertibles and capital insurance. The first two types of instruments mean that when 
the market value of a bank drops below the limit, the bond issued by the bank can be 
automatically converted into equity. Capital insurance means that when a specific 
event occurs, the contractor pays the appropriate amount to replenish the capital. 
For the bank, these kinds of instruments have the lower cost than common 
stocks but higher cost than bonds. In this way, the banks can guarantee that there will 
be enough equity capital to absorb losses during the crisis and avoid issuing large 
stocks as capital buffers in times of economic success, resulting in a decrease of 
profitability. Thus, banks will be willing to accept them if the superintendent take 
these accounts to the regulatory capital measure. 
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• Provision coverage ratio 
Provision coverage ratio refers to the ratio of all loan reserves of commercial 
banks to their NPL, which is an important indicator to reflect whether the commercial 
bank can bear the losses caused by NPL in the future, and the provision fund is 
derived from profits. The higher the provision coverage ratio, the stronger the ability 
of the bank to bear the loss in the future. However, excessive provision coverage 
means that more funds are limited and cannot be used for profit, this is a waste. 
Therefore, it is very important to find a proper provision coverage ratio. In China, the 
ideal value of the provision coverage ratio is around 150%. 
2.1.5 The Structure of Macroprudential Policy 
There are three factors of the macroprudential structure, they are 
macroprudential analysis, MPP instruments and MPP arrange.  
Macroprudential analysis is focused on detection and assessment of risks in the 
financial system. According to the risk sources of the financial system, the risk 
warning is issued to provide the information basis for MPP. There are four main 
models which can be used for assessing the risk relevance of financial institutions; 
these are the following:  network model, crisis dependency matrix model, CO-RISK 
model and default intensity model (Li, 2013). 
MPP toolkit is a set of feasible instruments to prevent risks to become systemic 
risks, as well as how to use these tools, how to judge the effectiveness of the policy 
(Viñals, 2011).     
Regarding the MPP arrange, representatives of central banks, financial circles 
and regulation and supervision institutions all need to take part in and make the team 
work to ensure financial stability. We can document it relevance with the following 
words of José Viñals: 
“The institutional architecture of MPP, including mechanisms of governance, 
accountability, and transparency; and coordination of MPP with other public policies 
aimed at preserving financial stability.” (Viñals, 2011, p.12). 
A well-defined macroprudential framework should ensure the realization of 
three objectives. The first one is to improve risk management of large-scale 
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institutions, further to formulate counter-cyclical policies and limit exposure of 
inter-bank transaction risks. The second one is to provide appropriate and accurate 
public information in time, which is necessary for both investors and regulators. 
Finally, macroprudential policies need to be coordinated with monetary policies. The 
reason is the existence of information asymmetry and policy lags. 
2.2 Systemic Risk 
As it known to all, the primary objective of the MPP is protecting the financial 
sector from the systemic risk, so we need to know what systemic risks are.  
If an event occurs that will cause most institutions in the financial system to 
lose confidence and be severe enough to adversely affect the entire financial system, 
then we call this a systemic risk. Its essence is the risk of bad events in the financial 
system. The consequences of it are often much more serious than the failure of a 
single financial institution (Hendricks, 2009). 
There are three stages of systemic risk; these are as following: accumulation, 
outbreak, and spread of systemic risks (contagion). 
2.2.1 Accumulation of Systemic Risks  
Systemic risks always have a long accumulation process, what means that 
systemic risk can accumulate over a long period of time without impacting on the 
financial environment. However, when it materializes after the phase of accumulation, 
it can have serious adverse impacts on financial sector and real economy. Paying 
attention to systemic risk accumulation is more important than focusing on the 
financial crisis itself, because it is easier to solve the problem from the source than 
solve the problem when they occur. We will illustrate the evolutionary process of the 
systemic risk in Tab 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Common Evolutionary Process of the Accumulation of Systemic Risk 
1STstage Investor is expected to optimistic 
2nd stage Willing to take more risk 
3rd stage Increase investment 
4th stage Expended risk exposure 
5th stage Leverage increased 
6th stage Financial institutions become vulnerable 
7th stage Systemic risk is accumulating 
Source: Self-elaboration based on Hendricks (2009) 
After this process, systemic risk accumulated, financial sector will be weaker 
and weaker. Until the materialization of the systemic risk. 
2.2.2 Outbreak of Systemic Risks 
When systemic risks accumulate to a certain extent, some unexpected events 
might occur. For example, when one financial institution goes bankrupt, the central 
bank suddenly tightens the money supply and the asset price bubble bursts, such as 
events could be triggers for systemic risks.  
The traditional view that a systemic crisis starts with the collapse of a single 
financial institution which is systemically important, and triggers a crisis of 
repayments and, in turn, spreads to other financial institutions, and so we think the 
initial booster of a risk explosion is exogenous. Subsequent studies suggest that most 
institutions in the financial system will be affected in the event of problems by 
holding the same financial instruments for most of the seasons and exposing them to 
the same risk exposures. In other words, the booster may also be an internal factor. 
2.2.3 Spread of Systemic Risks 
The spread of systemic risk is the main reason for the financial crisis. The 
impact of systemic risk will cause the assets of financial institutions to shrink 
substantially, which in turn will erode profits and capital of financial institutions, 
exacerbating asset sales and price declines. For the indebted parties, the normal 
funding channels of financial institutions can no longer be used. The outflow of funds 
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could lead financial institutions into a liquidity crisis and insolvency. Generally, the 
more developed are financial markets, the greater is the spread of systemic risks. Tab. 
2.2 will show us the spread of systemic risks, it is following: 
Tab. 2.2 Spread of Systemic Risks 
1st stage After the risk accumulates to a certain extent, the financial 
institutions are harmed 
2nd stage A few banks went bankrupt or loss money 
3rd stage Many banks went bankrupt or loss money 
4th stage Financial crisis 
Source: Self-elaboration based on (Li, 2013) 
2.2.4 Systemic Risk Comparison 
The Tab. 2.3 shows the traditional and the current view on systemic risk. The 
differences are as following: 
Tab. 2.3 Comparison of Different Views on Systemic Risk 
Traditional view New view 
The financial system is inherently 
fragile and there is no risk-accumulation 
process 
The accumulation of systemic risk is 
more important than the fuse of a crisis 
The crisis starts with the collapse of a 
single financial institution 
Risk outbreak starts when the same risk 
exposures held by financial institutions 
The risk-diffusion mechanism is 
endogenous, but the initial impact is 
exogenous 
Systemic risk is endogenous, including 
the risk-diffusion and initial impact 
The channel of risk diffusion is the high 
correlation of the financial institution's 
balance sheet 
There are many channels for spreading 
the risks 
Source: Self-elaboration based on Zhang (2010) 
2.3 Monetary Policy 
MP is really an important and necessary part of the macroeconomic policies. In 
this sub-chapter we will describe MP objective theory, instruments of MP, evaluation 
of MP and unconventional MP. 
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2.3.1 Monetary Policy Objective Theory 
In the monetary objectives system, there are three kinds of objectives: operating 
objective, intermediate objective and final objective (Li, 2013). 
When we define an operating objective, we should ensure these three 
requirements: it should be controlled, predictable and relevant. Operating objective is 
used for affecting an intermediate objective in order to fulfill a final objective. When 
we set up an intermediate objective, the requirements are almost the same compared 
to operating objective, however, there is one more requirement: anti-interfere 
performance. Final objective is an objective which the MP wants to fulfill in a 
long-run period. 
There are four possible final objectives of MP. These are as following: price 
stability, full employment, economic growth and balance of payments (Li, 2013).   
It is impossible to achieve the four final goals of MP at the same time because 
of the constraints among these objectives. Sometimes there is a conflict between the 
two goals. For example, if we want to secure employment, we need to protect the 
existing jobs. If we want to promote economic growth, we need to encourage 
technological innovation. Sometimes, however, science and technology will replace 
labor force as a productive force. And new technology requires less staff than 
traditional industries, causing many workers in traditional industries to lose their jobs, 
so central bank has to choose. It is worth mentioning that since the 1990s, inflation 
targeting has emerged and has become the most popular MP objective. We can see the 
final objectives of MP in different (selected) countries in Tab. 2.4. 
From the Tab. 2.4, we can see the three types of target systems, the first one is 
the single target system and the second one is dual target system, the last one is 
multiple target system. 
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Tab. 2.4 Final MP Objectives of Selected Countries  
Country Target system Specific goals 
China Dual target system Stabilize prices and promote 
economic growth 
United States of America Multiple target system Take into account price 
stability and full 
employment, and stimulate 
economic recovery 
England Single target system stabilize prices 
France Single target system stabilize prices 
Germany Dual target system stabilize prices and promote 
economic growth 
Source: Self-elaboration based on Li (2013, p.40) 
     China and Germany choose the dual target system, because they select stabilize 
prices and promote economic growth as their MP goals. And England and France 
choose the single target system, because they select stabilize prices as their monetary 
goal, and the America choose the multiple target system, they select price stability and 
full employment and stimulate economic recovery as their monetary goals. 
The policy makers who use single target system believe that with no respect to 
the phase of business cycle, they just need to set up only one MP final objective 
because it is more suitable for achieving the objective. And there are two main 
objectives, they are economic growth target system and price level stable target 
system, policy maker has to choose one of them to be the single target. 
However, the policy makers who use dual target system believe that the MP 
objective which set up by the central bank should not be single in different period. 
Unlike the single target system, which pays attention to either economic growth or 
price stability, the dual target system considers these two objectives together (Li qiong, 
2009). 
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2.3.2 The Instruments of Monetary Policy 
We will introduce universal MP instruments in this part. There are three basic 
instruments and they are: reserve requirements, re-discount policy and open market 
operations (Li, 2013). 
• Reserve Requirements  
     The reserve requirements refer to the central bank ask the commercial bank to 
deposit the money in the central bank account according to a certain percentage of the 
deposit of the commercial bank. The purpose of this instrument is to ensure that 
commercial banks have sufficient level of liquidity in an event of a sudden and 
substantial withdrawal of bank deposits.  
     Central bank can influence money supply by changing reserve requirements. 
When the central bank want to increase money supply, it can reduce the reserve 
requirements, because the reserve requirements have dropped, banks have more 
money to provide loans, borrowers are also easier to get money, which is equivalent to 
increasing the market circulation of currency, increasing the money supply; on 
contrary, if the central bank wants to decrease money supply, is just need to increase 
reserve requirements, because banks' ability to provide loans diminishes as reserve 
requirements rise, the amount of money circulating in the market declines, it means 
money supply has dropped. 
     Since the 1930s, the reserve requirements system has become an important 
mean for the government to regulate the economy. It is a system by which the central 
bank influences the credit size of commercial banks. This system stipulates that 
commercial banks cannot use all deposits they acquired in the form of newly granted 
loans, i.e. they have to deposit a certain proportion of them in the central bank. 
In many developed countries, the instrument of reserve requirements has been 
gradually phased out or used for other reasons. However, reserve requirements remain 
a very common MP tool in developing countries. As reported by Fungacova, 
Nuutilainen and Weill (2015), in year 2007, the reserve requirements were adjusted 10 
times, and from 2008 to 2013, the reserve requirements were adjusted 24 times. 
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• Re-discount Policy   
The re-discount rate is the interest rate of the central bank on commercial banks 
or other financial institutions. If the central bank wants to reduce the money supply 
and shrink credit, it should increase the re-discount rate, which will increase the cost 
of commercial banks’ financing in central banks and reduce the amounts of 
commercial banks’ funds. As a result, commercial banks give their clients’ money and 
investment will be reduced, which will lead to a reduction in the supply of money on 
the market. If we want to stimulate economic growth and expand investment, central 
bank should reduce the re-discount rate. 
• Open Market Operations 
     Open market operations refer to the central bank purchase or sale of securities, 
affect the amount of money circulating in the market through open market operations, 
regulating of the money supply, Unlike the securities traded by ordinary financial 
institutions, the purpose of buying and selling securities by the central bank is not for 
profit but to regulate money supply. According to the development of the economy, 
when central bank deems it necessary to reduce monetary base, it sells securities and 
recovers accordingly a portion of its base currency to reduce the amount of funds 
available to financial institutions. On contrary, when central bank deems it necessary 
to ease its MP, it buys securities, and expand and directly increases the amount of 
funds available to financial institutions (Li, 2013). 
2.3.3 Evaluation of Monetary Policy 
The effect of MP refers to the degree of change in aggregate demand and total 
income levels caused by MP. Whether the effectiveness of MP is significant depends 
on the following three factors. 
• Lag of Monetary Policy 
Changes in MP usually take time to affect the economy. Time lag may be 
between nine months and two years. Fiscal policy and its impact on output is 
relatively short. When MP attempts to stimulate the economy by lowering interest 
rates, it can take up to 18 months for signs of any improvement in the economy (Li, 
2013). 
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• Psychological expectations of micro-subjects 
When the MP is implemented, the micro-entities will predict and react 
according to the information obtained, which may make the MP ineffective. For 
example, when people expect the inflation rate to be consistent with that of the 
previous period, companies will think that the price of their products will rise so that 
the worker willing provide more labor and the number of commodities will rise, 
because people are willing to provide more labor, manufacturers are willing to 
provide more goods, employment rates rise. Making the MP effective in short-run. 
However, in the long run, people will not make this mistakes, manufacturers and 
laborers will find that the prices of their products and services do not rise after 
considering inflation, MP is invalid. 
• Cooperation of Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy. 
Monetary and fiscal policies are two basic tools for the state. They mainly 
adjust the relationship between aggregate supply and aggregate demand through 
expansionary and contractionary policies. These two policies must be properly used in 
order to bring about more coordinated cooperation (Li, 2013). 
2.3.4 Unconventional Monetary Policy 
     When the policy of adjusting policy (official) rate loses its effect, and 
policymakers can no longer rely on lowering the nominal interest rate in the short 
term to expand liquidity and stimulate the economy, they have to adopt 
unconventional tools of monetary such as policy quantitative easing. 
Quantitative easing is a kind of MP. When faced with the economic and 
financial crisis, the central bank quickly reduces the policy interest rate to a historical 
low point or close to zero，and releases a lot of liquidity directly to the market to 
promote economic and financial recovery (Mu, 2010). 
     There are three forms of unconventional MP, including leading the public to 
anticipate the development of future interest rate policy, expanding the size of the 
central bank's balance sheet and adjusting the structure of the central bank's balance 
sheet (Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack, 2004). 
 
23 
 
     Another strategy they can use is to target commercial banks and private sector 
assets in an attempt to spur economic growth by encouraging banks to lend more 
money. Note that quantitative easing is often referred to as "QE". In quantitative 
easing, central bank targets the supply of money by buying bond, in particular 
government bonds. When there is an economic downturn, and the central bank wants 
to encourage economic growth, it buys bonds from commercial banks and provide 
them with additional liquidity. This lowers short-term market interest rates and 
increases money supply. This strategy loses effectiveness when interest rates approach 
zero; at this point, banks have to implement other strategies to promote economic 
activity.  
2.3.5 Channels of Monetary Policy  
When MP is established, it needs some channels to make it effective. Any 
factors that can affect the availability and price of credit will affect the volume of 
credit and thus affect the transmission of MP. Usually MP plays a role through bank 
lending channel, balance sheet channel and asset price channel. 
     The first one is the bank lending channel, which operates through bank credit. It 
is based on the mechanism by which monetary authorities influence the costs and the 
source of funding for banks. As the interest rate on MP falls, the costs of raising funds 
in the money market will also drop. Therefore, banks can provide more and cheaper 
loans to households and businesses. Households and companies which may be rated 
as too risky before MP is been loosened can obtain credit now. Banks' capital channels 
have similar effects – loose MP has increased banks' profitability, resulting in higher 
levels of capitalization and higher willingness to grant new loans.  
The second one is balance sheet channel, which influences the ability of 
households and businesses to obtain credit backed by assets. When interest rates fall, 
the prices of assets that can be used as collateral when applying for loans rise. The fall 
in interest rates reduce the cost of borrower financing, thus credit demand increases, 
which will lead to accelerated credit growth, followed by increased consumption and 
investment demand.  
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The last one is the asset price channel. Through this channel, in general, we 
assume that if there is decreasing in policy rates, then there is increasing in asset 
prices, which will make people feel that they have become richer. Under such 
circumstances, consumption will rise. For companies, the stock price rises, which 
means that the capital cost of the company is reduced，because each share can get 
more money, it makes it easier for companies to get funding.  
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3 Characteristic of the Interaction of Macroprudential Policy and 
Monetary Policy  
     After the financial crisis of 2007, academics and policymakers began to think 
about the relationship between MPP and MP more deeply. The term of 
macroprudential has been used since 1970s but people pay more attention to it 
particularly after the crisis.  
     MPP and MP can both influence financial system, and they have some common 
characteristics. The first one is that both of them have macro characteristics, i.e. they 
use the aggregate view to consider the whole economy. The second one is that they 
have the counter-cyclical nature, but when comparing with the MP, MPP are more 
counter-cyclical. And the last one is that they are both important parts of financial 
policies (Li, 2013).  
     In this chapter we will describe the background and theoretical basis of the 
relationship between MPP and MP, i.e. we will write about the interaction of their 
objectives and instruments. In the end of this chapter, we will present how to design 
the policy portfolios. 
3.1 The Background of Relationship between Macroprudential Policy and 
Monetary Policy  
     Initially, MPP was dedicated to address the risks posed by the rapid growth of 
loans from developing countries. Subsequently, macroprudential policies have been 
used as guidelines for macroeconomic regulation and supervision. What we should 
learn from the lesson of the last financial crisis is that price stability does not 
necessarily ensure the stability of financial system and real economy. Therefore, 
policy makers have to understand the nature of the relationship between 
macroprudential and MP and combine them together to achieve defined policy 
objectives. 
After the financial crisis of 2007, the macroprudential concept has been further 
expanded, and the relationship between finance and real economy was considered by 
MPP. The purpose of macroprudential regulation is to protect financial sector from 
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systemic risk and to act counter-cyclically. MP acts counter-cyclically as well, 
however, micro-prudential regulation could be pro-cyclical, so they might be in a 
conflict sometimes. Therefor we think that conflict and cooperation exist at the same 
time.   
     Moreover, a significant attention has been paid to the deficiencies of the MP 
when it deals with the problems of financial cycle. At this time, macroprudential 
framework gradually exceeded the concept of supervision and formed an independent 
policy.  
     In the past few decades, there have been four important global economic 
developments. Firstly, the inflation levels and their volatility have declined. Secondly 
the cyclical fluctuations of asset prices, credit and investment have increase and 
financial crises have occurred more frequently. Thirdly, the real economy has been 
rapidly growing. Lastly, the global trade imbalances have continued to intensify (Li, 
2013). 
     Two of aforementioned developments are considered as a good phenomenon 
but the other two are not; as we can see in Tab. 3.1. 
Tab. 3.1 Four Economic Phenomena  
Inflation levels and their volatility have declined. Good phenomenon 
The real economy has been rapidly growing. 
The volatility of asset prices, credit and investment has 
been increasing. Financial crises have occurred more 
frequently. Bad phenomenon 
The global trade imbalances have continued to 
intensify. 
Source: Self-elaboration 
     In the past, when the financial crisis of 2007 and the subsequent economic crisis 
broke out, people sought after many reasons explaining it. However, with the 
continuous revision of MP, the global economy is still experiencing problems. 
Nowadays, it has been generally accepted that there should be MPP to supplement 
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(“tidy up”) for the deficiencies of MP. However, these two policies cannot be 
combined or replaced by each other because their focus and objectives are different. 
Although they can cooperate with each other, they also could be in a contradiction 
(Claudio and Gabrieland, 2016). 
     For example, there is a risk-taking channel of MP transmission. Through this 
channel, continuous downward adjustment of interest rates in the period of sustained 
loose MP will motivate commercial banks to take on more risks and to have an 
excessive leverage (Borio and Zhu, 2008). Moreover, Borio and Drehmann (2009) 
think that it is not enough to cope with the cross-sectional dimension of systemic risk, 
i.e. it is difficult to eliminate the contagion of financial risks. In such a situation, we 
need to use both policies together to complement each other (Li, 2013). 
     Moreover, MP can affect the price of assets. Because when people hold an asset, 
the interest rate is not the profit, but represents the cost for the debtor. When interest 
rate changes, the cost for debtor changes as well, that will lead to the differences of 
price of assets. In theory, the rise in asset prices caused by falling interest rates will 
not cause asset price bubbles. However, in some situations, if there is no proper 
treatment, the rise of prices could continue, and then create a bubble of assets prices. 
As a result, systemic risk will accumulate, and the MPP has been designed to 
eliminate systemic risk (Li, 2013). 
3.2 The Interaction of the Policy Objectives  
     As we know, the main objective of MP is to keep stable inflation and promote 
economic growth. MPP should ensure the stability of financial markets and reduce the 
volatility of asset prices. Judging from the current situation, in order to implement 
regulation, the macroprudential and monetary policies must be properly coordinated 
mainly because: 
• The two objectives are closely linked. As the target of policy, they must fully 
consider various factors. First of all, the goal of MP is the foundation for MPP，i.e. 
that MPP is easier to implement when MP was valid. When the objective of MP is 
achieved, a favorable financial environment is provided, which is conducive to 
achieving the goal of MPP. On the other hand, the conduction of MP requires the MP 
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transmission mechanism.  
Therefore, the status of commercial banks, financial institutions and financial 
markets all play key roles. If the financial institutions operate stably, they will be able 
to provide guarantees for the implementation of MP. Because, when the MP 
transmission mechanism working, there are some important factors need to be 
controlled, such as banks’ lending rates, bond’s price, interest rates and so on, only 
when the financial institutions are stable, these factors can be controlled easily and let 
the transmission mechanism more efficient. 
• The two objectives affect each other when the MP is not fully implemented. 
Problems will arise in the macro-economics, leading to increased systemic risks, 
affecting the fulfillment of MPP goals. The reverse is the same. When the systemic 
risks are too great, MP will also be adversely affected. 
• The two goals are complementary. Reliance only on one policy cannot guarantee 
the stable operation of the economy. For example, in the management of 
counter-cyclical issues, only the two can be combined to achieve better results. But 
sometimes, they are contradictory. This means that contradictions and cooperation 
exist at the same time. Policy makers need to make the adjustment according to 
specific goals and actual conditions.  
The simultaneous existence of such contradictions and cooperation has forced 
us to think carefully about their interactions in different phases of the financial and 
business cycle and to coordinate at the appropriate time (Borio, 2013). We will 
demonstrate it with the help of the Tab. 3.2. It will help us to understand how to 
coordinate both policies in different phases of business and financial cycle. 
In order to better understand aforementioned table, we should know that the 
policy mix here is not always optimal, and that when the demand is weak, and the 
leverage ratio drops, loose MPP will help the transmission of MP, and eliminate 
pessimistic expectations, stabilize the financial sector and promote economic recovery. 
However, if the financial sector is too weak, loose MPP may undermine its confidence, 
caused the failure of MPP. 
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Because when the financial institutions are relatively vulnerable, loose MPP 
will make people think that financial institutions are not stable enough and lack of 
help, they will think that the risk of investment is too large at this time. In reaction, we 
should increase the CAR of banks and tighten MPP to ensure the operation of MP. 
Tab. 3.2 Interaction of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies at Different Phases of 
Financial and Business Cycle. 
 Inflationary pressures Disinflationary pressures 
Strong 
demand 
Weak demand Strong 
demand 
Weak demand 
Rapid credit 
growth 
Monetary pol. 
and rising asset 
prices  
Tightening > 
IT 
Tightening Easing< IT Easing 
Tightening Tightening Tightening Tightening 
Decline in credit 
and falling asset 
prices 
Tightening Tightening < 
IT 
Easing Easing> IT 
Easing Easing Easing Easing 
Note: Some combinations are unlikely. The symbols > IT and < IT denote MP responses that are, 
respectively, stronger and weaker than those needed to attain the inflation target. Green boxes = 
policies complement each other. Red boxes = policies are potentially in a conflict. Combinations where 
inflation is close to the target, loans are growing at a reasonable rate and asset prices are at normal 
levels are not shown in the table, as in these cases the responses of the two policies will be moderate 
and will not interact significantly. 
Source: Frait, Malovaná and Tomšík (2015) 
However, in real life, these two policies are actually very difficult to coordinate, 
especially when these two policies are implemented by different agencies. For 
example, when systemic risks and inflation are concerned, systemic risks are not 
easily revealed. The reason is that inflation is easier to be revealed related to the 
changes of price level, but we cannot realize the systemic risk as soon as realize the 
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inflation problem. Monetary authorities often prioritize stable inflation. Different 
objects of these two policies make it difficult to coordinate them properly.  
However, people believe that the use of MPP is the best way to prevent the 
financial sector from becoming fragile. MP is not effective at this point, especially at 
the time of credit boom. Because in some certain conditions, there will be some 
conflicts when the inflation targeting MP want to make the credit stable. For example, 
the low inflation rate may let the banks or investors think the risk is lower than the 
average level, and the low risk premium will lead to the increasing of the financial 
products’ price.  
These processes will improve the growth of credit. The MP will not to prevent 
the financial sector from being fragile. In this case, the central bank can set interest 
rates at a higher level, this change can improve the effectiveness of macroprudential 
polities (Frait, Malovaná and Tomšík, 2015).  
3.3 The Interaction of the Policy Instruments 
In general, the main instruments of MP are deposit reserve system, rediscount 
policy and open market operations. Regarding the MPP, the main tools are: capital 
requirements, change of the capital structure of financial institutions, regulation for 
liabilities maturity and capital liquidity, and contingent capital instruments and so on. 
They are interconnected, but sometimes there are conflicts, how they should be 
coordinated depends on what the main problems are currently and what the policy 
objectives are. 
Recording to Goodhart’s model (2009), under the pressure of future inflation, 
MP will increase the default rate and thus impose constraints on the leverage ratio that 
can confirm MP can be used with MPP to control the leverage cycle. And people think 
the interaction of MP and MPP can not only keep the price level stable, but also can 
keep the stability of financial markets, and can reduce the systemic risks (Li, 2013). 
We want to make a table to compare the instruments of MP and MPP. Results 
are shown in Tab. 3.3. 
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Tab. 3.3: Comparing of Monetary Policy Tools and Macroprudential Policy Tools 
Policy tools Action object Tools´ objective Final goal 
Monetary 
policy tools 
Reserve requirements Money multiplier Economic growth 
Price stability 
Rediscount policy Money supply Economic growth 
Price level stable 
Open market operations Monetary base Economic growth 
Price level stable 
Macroprudential 
policy tools 
Leverage ratio Credit balance Financial 
stability 
Loan-to-value ratio Credit balance Financial 
stability 
Excess capital 
requirements 
Credit expansion 
capacity 
Financial 
stability 
Source: Self-elaboration based on Li (2013, p. 245) 
Thus, when choosing a MP or MPP tool we should pay attention to the 
following points: 
• MP instruments and MPP instruments should remain relatively independent; 
• The aims of MP instruments and MPP instruments should be distinguished, 
otherwise there could be conflicts in the implementation process; 
• A sound information platform should be established to avoid conflicts.   
3.4 Policy Portfolio Design 
    The portfolio of MP and MPP cannot only achieve the goal of price stability and 
financial stability, but it can improve the effect of policy implementation to a large 
extent as well. 
    There are several advantages of these policies´ portfolios: 
• The objective of MP and the objective of MPP are closely linked. 
• MP and MPP are complementary. 
• The interaction between MP and MPP can reduce the policy conflicts. 
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    The requirements for the policy portfolio are as following: it should consider the 
timing of the policy action; make full use of the interaction between MP and MPP; 
and avoid the conflicts between MP and MPP (Li, 2013). 
When we design the policy portfolio, we should notice that the role of MP should 
be in the period of macroeconomic reversal (for example: inflation turn into deflation), 
thus ensuring that the macroeconomic level fluctuates around time axis. It means 
when macroeconomic level is too high, using the restrictive MP to decrease it; when 
the level is too low, using the expansionary MP to increase it. The curve of it is almost 
as same as business cycle. When the macroeconomy is in the contractionary phase of 
business cycle, the central bank should use expansionary MP to promote economic 
growth; at the same time, macroprudential regulators should start to reduce the 
pro-cyclical effects of financial markets and prevent systemic risks. 
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4 Empirical Analysis of Interaction of Macroprudential Policy and 
Monetary Policy in China       
 In this chapter, firstly, we will introduce the conduction of MPP and MP in 
China, and then we will input the related macroeconomic data and the data of policy 
instruments. Moreover, we will make the empirical analysis of the interaction of the 
MPP and the MP in China from 2007 to 2016 and summarize the results. 
4.1 Macroprudential Policy and Monetary Policy in China 
In this part, we will introduce basic information about MPP and MP in China, 
include the MPP and MP in China's development, status, and future trends. More 
importantly, we will introduce the so-called double-pillar framework. 
4.1.1 Macroprudential Policy in China 
As we all know, since the 1970s, the Chinese economy has entered a period of 
rapid development. However, due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the world 
financial crisis in 2008, China has to pay attention to macroprudential policies. And 
China joined the Basel Committee, and began a careful and detailed study on MPP in 
2009. 
     In addition, Xiaochuan Zhou, governor of the central bank of China, believes 
that one of the main reasons to implement macroprudential policies is that, there are 
too many pro-cyclical factors in the process of conventional macroeconomic 
operations. For example, people usually use the situation in the market as the basis for 
their own judgment, whether it is an individual or an institution. When a person earns 
money in the stock market, he will certainly want to make more money in stock 
market, even willing to use leverage and take more risk. In the stock market, if 
everyone is optimistic, then the stock price is not easy to fall, because in this case, 
there are no people will sell their stock at a lower price. 
 If everyone in the market does this, the pro-cyclicality of the market will 
become very strong. Resulting the economy has the period of “good times”, the stock 
market is good, and the companies are more profitable, if there is no counter-cyclical 
policy, it is very dangerous. 
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In 2011, the Central Bank of China officially implemented a dynamic 
adjustment mechanism for differential reserves, which means setting different reserve 
requirements ratios according to the CAR and capital quality of each financial 
institution.  
This mechanism aims to match the pace of expansion of financial institutions 
with the size of capital, thus, to reduce the possibility of systemic risk materialization. 
This mechanism is very advanced throughout the world. It does not only set the 
requirements for capital adequacy for each financial institution individually from the 
perspective of MPP, but also takes into account the actual situation of every financial 
institution.  
It also requires each financial institution to design expansion plans according to 
its own capabilities so as to avoid the excessive growth of credit and the accumulation 
of systemic risks (Li, 2013). 
In 2016, the Central Bank of China upgraded this mechanism to MPA, further, 
it incorporated more financial activities into its management scope, and implemented 
counter-cyclical adjustments. The regulatory objectives of this system include capital 
and leverage, assets and liabilities, liquidity, pricing, asset quality, foreign debt risk, 
implementation of credit policies, etc. Among them, capital is the core of this 
evaluation system (Zhou, 2017).  
In 2017, the Central Bank of China proposed a double-pillar framework, which 
means a financial management system is based on MPP and MP. According to Gang 
Yi, deputy governor of the Central Bank of China, the double-pillar framework has 
two functions. The first one is to maintain the stability of the currency value and the 
second one is to maintain the stability of the financial system. 
4.1.2 Monetary Policy in China 
Unlike other countries' monetary policies, China's MP is not loose, tight, or 
neutral. Chinese call it 'steady'. Its meaning is to maintain a moderate growth of the 
money supply and to support the sustained, stable, and healthy development of the 
national economy on the premise of stabilizing the currency value, preventing 
financial risks, and improving the quality of loans. It includes both prevention of 
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inflation and prevention and deflation (Zhou, 2012). 
China has its own problems. As a developing country, China’s per capital 
income is low, and there is a lot of room for improvement. It is in a period of rapid 
development. The enthusiasm of each institution and individual is very high, so it is 
prone to be overly optimistic. This means that most people are looking forward to 
more relaxed MP and easier access to loans.  
However, this has created a potential inflationary pressure and the amplitude of 
business cycle is higher. This means that economic development is too rapid, which 
leads to the accumulation of systemic risks and it is easy to lose rational judgment in 
the sustainable development of the economy (Zhou, 2012).  
As a developing country, China’s degree of marketization is not as good as that 
of developed countries. This means that the market itself is not strong enough and the 
government should play a greater role. Therefore, China’s MP needs to consider more 
factors and continue to improve MP to meet the regulatory needs of the market.  
In this case, the single target system is not suitable for China. China adopted a 
multiple-target system. The objectives of China's MP have four parts: firstly, to 
maintain a low inflation rate, secondly, to ensure the healthy growth of the economy, 
thirdly, to maintain full employment, and lastly, to have balanced balance of payment 
i.e. international external equilibrium. In these four goals, the commitment to low 
inflation is the most important (Yi, 2017). 
All in all, China's MP is very cautious. It is neither willing to be too loose nor 
willing to be too tight. As a developing country and at the same time a big country, 
China’s MP must take into consideration each side. It can neither develop too slowly 
nor develop too fast. At the same time, it needs to stay calm during the development 
and prevent possible risks. This is a challenge for China. 
4.1.3 Double-pillar Framework in China 
The double-pillar framework is a new term and was proposed by China in 2017. 
The double-pillar framework refers to a system that use the MPP and MP as a core 
policy. In this system, MPP and MP have the same status, they are equally important.   
For China, the two-pillar framework is very important. For the world, this is a 
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new attempt, which means the term “macroprudential” was firstly used in the 1970s, 
however, the policy started to form later on, and now MPP become as important as 
MP. This process only took half a century. Of course, if the MPP wants to fulfill its 
mission, it needs the cooperation of every financial institution and individual in the 
entire financial system. 
Why does China necessarily need a double-pillar framework? Fan (2017) thinks 
that there are three reasons. Firstly, in the past, every financial crisis has impacted on 
the traditional regulatory framework and inspired people. For example, the Great 
Depression in the 1930s prompted the birth of Keynesianism. After the stagflation in 
the 1970s, economists rethought the role of MP that the main objectives of MP should 
be to stabilize prices and prevent inflation.  
However, after the financial crisis happened in 2007, people realized that price 
stability does not necessarily ensure financial stability. The development of financial 
markets changed the demand for MP, especially because of the globalization of 
finance, more assets were exposed to the same risks, resulting in the contagiousness 
of market risks becomes stronger and systemic risks are more likely to accumulate. In 
this case, relying solely on MP cannot solve this problem. However, macroprudential 
policies can well solve systemic risk issues. Finally, a double-pillar framework has 
been formed. 
Secondly, due to the expansion of the financial markets, business transactions 
between financial institutions have become more frequent. This has led to the 
exposure of more financial institutions´ assets to the same risks and increased the 
contagion of systemic risk.  
Due to the innovation in the financial markets, the flow of funds has become 
faster, the channels have become more complex, and the scale has become larger. 
Under such circumstances, the previous MPP can no longer meet people's needs. 
What we need is more stringent MPP with more extensive supervision and greater 
intensity of supervision. 
Thirdly, the irrational behavior of the market participants expands the 
pro-cyclicality of the markets. We have already mentioned the “herd effect”, which 
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means that when people make decisions, they will change their decisions based on the 
judgment of the people or leaders around them. When some people are optimistic, it 
often leads to more optimism at the markets, and vice-versa. Compared with the past, 
today's financial markets are more and more developed, the herd effect is more 
obvious, and lots of market behavior has been strengthened, so we need a stronger 
MPP. 
To sum up, the formation of the two-pillar framework is mainly due to the fact 
that the development of the financial markets has led to a stronger market demand for 
macroprudential policies. Of course, the double-pillar framework is a new system, and 
everything needs to be tested in practice. 
4.2 Macroeconomic Variables in China 
In this part, we will describe the general situation of the Chinese economy from 
2007 to 2016. We describe China’s economy by describing GDP, growth rate of GDP, 
inflation rate and volume of provided credit.  
The reason for choosing GDP is simple, because it represents the total value of 
a country’s domestic output of goods and services in each year. The more value it 
created, the economy’s situation is better. Further, we choose inflation rate because it 
is one of the main objectives of MP, and it is an important indicator which measures 
the price level development.  
The volume of credit will be affected by MP and MPP. When the banks’ asset 
structure is adjusted, the ability of banks to provide loans change, and the final 
volume of credit will also be different. 
4.2.1 Description of Gross Domestic Product 
In this part, we will describe the GDP and its growth rate in China from 2007 to 
2016 and analyze their development. Tab. 4.1 and Fig. 4.1 show the aforementioned 
variables. 
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Tab. 4.1 Gross Domestic Product and its Annual Growth Rate from 2007 to 2016 
Time GDP (In 100 million RMB) GDP annual growth rate (%) 
2007 270844 14.2 
2008 321500 9.7 
2009 348498 9.4 
2010 411265 10.7 
2011 484753 9.5 
2012 539116 7.9 
2013 590422 7.8 
2014 644791 7.3 
2015 686449 6.9 
2016 740598 6.7 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2016), The World Bank (2016) 
Figure 4.1 GDP and GDP Annual Growth Rate from 2007 to 2016 
 
Sources: Self-elaboration 
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Form Tab. 4.1 and Fig. 4.1, we can see that China's GDP is growing every year, 
but the GDP annual growth rate is not optimistic. Firstly, in 2008, the growth rate of 
GDP fell by 4.57 p.p. and then, after 2010, the GDP annual growth rate has been 
continuously falling. However, in each year after 2011, the rate of decline of GDP 
growth rate is controlled within 1 p.p. Obviously, it should not be too pessimistic, 
because even 6.7% of the GDP annual growth rate is very high compared with other 
developing countries. 
4.2.2 Description of Inflation Rate 
In this part, we will describe the inflation rate from 2007 to 2016 and illustrate 
it. The results are displayed in the Fig. 4.2. 
Fig. 4.2 Inflation Rate from 2007 to 2016 
Source: The World Bank (2016) 
Before the analysis, we need to know that China’s inflation target is between 2% 
and 3%. This was proposed by the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of China, Yi 
Gang, in 2008. From Fig. 4.2, we can see that during the period from 2007 to 2011, 
China's inflation rate fluctuates significantly, reached the highest values in 2008, 5.9%, 
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4.8%
5.9%
-0.7%
3.3%
5.4%
2.6%
2.6%
2.0%
1.4%
2.0%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Inflation rate 
40 
 
financial crisis of 2007, people were more likely to put money into banks and were no 
longer willing to invest.  
During the period from 2009 to 2011, the inflation rate increased very rapidly, 
reaching 5.4% within two years. This is still a higher figure for China, because 
China’s ideal inflation rate is between 2% and 3%. However, after 2011, China’s 
inflation rate has remained below 3%, indicating that the target about inflation rate of 
MP has been achieved. 
4.2.3 Description of Volume of Credit  
Fig. 4.3 Total Volume of Credit in China from 2007 to 2016 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2016) 
The volume of credit is directly affected by changes in the deposit reserve 
ratio, and it also It also reflects people’s attitude towards risk. When people are 
optimistic, the volume of credit always tends to increase, when people's expectations 
for the future are not good, the volume of credit always tends to decrease. Through 
Fig 4.3, we have found that China’s credit volume was growing from 2007 to 2009 
and experienced decline from 2009 to 2011. However, since 2011, the volume of 
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4.3 Description and Analysis of Monetary Policy Tools and Macroprudential 
Policy Tools 
In this section, we select the deposit reserve ratio and interest rate as the 
representative of MP tools. And we also choose adequacy ratio and provision ratio as 
the selected MPP tools. 
First of all, every time the central bank adjusts interest rates and deposit reserve 
ratios, it has a purpose. We have mentioned before that deposit reserve ratio is an 
important tool of MP, it is aimed to ensure commercial banks' solvency and reduce 
default risks and MP can change the money supply by changing the deposit reserve 
ratio and change the ability of banks to provide loans by changing the interest rate.  
The CAR and provision coverage are also the same. Both of them can change 
the usage of bank funds and thus influence the ability of banks to provide loans and 
the amount of money on the market. 
4.3.1 Description and Analysis of Monetary Policy Tools 
We will describe the situation of deposit reserve ratio and interest rate from 
2007 to 2016 in China, and then we will make the analysis of them. The results are 
shown in Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5. 
Fig. 4.4 Deposit Reserve Ratio of China from 2007 to 2016 
 
Source: The People’s Bank of China (2016) 
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From the Fig. 4.4 we can see that the changes of Chinese deposit reserve ratio 
from 2007 to 2016. We note that the deposit reserve ratio reached its highest point in 
2011 (21%). In 2007, it was at its lowest value of 14.5%. It is worth mentioning that 
between 2007 and 2011, the deposit reserve ratio continued to increase, and from 
2011 to 2016, the deposit reserve ratio continued to decline, except for 2013 and 2014, 
when it stayed unchanged.  
Based on the actual situation, this is very consistent with the cyclical nature of 
finance: after experiencing the financial crisis in 2007, the government chose lower 
value of deposit reserve ratio in order to stimulate the economy, i.e. that. In the 
process of economic recovery, the deposit reserve ratio was gradually increased, this 
is in order to prevent the excessive credit expansion and inflation. In this process, we 
should keep adjusting according to the actual market conditions. 
Now, we can easily understand the changes in volume of credit. In 2007, the 
deposit reserve ratio was very low, banks have more funds to provide loans, which led 
to an increase in the volume of credit. In the process, the government kept adjusting 
the deposit reserve ratio in order to control the expansion of credit volume. In 2009, 
China’s credit volume reached its first peak. In 2011, the deposit reserve ratio was as 
high as 21%, which was the highest value. Since then, the deposit reserve ratio has 
gradually declined, and the credit volume has gradually increased at a very steady 
growth rate.  
Fig. 4.5 Interest Rate of China from 2007 to 2016 
 
Source：The People’s Bank of China (2016) 
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Fig 4.5 shows us the interest rate for loans which have a maturity with more 
than five years in China from 2007 to 2016. We can see that China’s interest rate has 
been greatly reduced from 2007 to 2008. This is to stimulate the economy and 
encourage people to consume or invest. This is the same purpose as is in the case of 
decreasing deposit reserve ratio.  
Increasing interest rates gradually after 2008 and gradually decreasing after 
2011 are all in line with China's credit volume, which means that when interest rates 
fall, the demand for credit will increase. But interest rates still can't explain the issues 
we mentioned before about deflation. 
4.3.2 Description and Analysis of Marco-prudential Policy Tools 
As we mentioned before, CAR is an important tool for MPP. It represents the 
ability of commercial banks to take risks themselves. Because China has started to 
implement MPP from 2009, we only describe and analyze China's CAR from 2009 to 
2016. 
Fig. 4.6 Capital Adequacy Ratio from 2009 to 2016 in China 
  
Source: Bank of China Insurance Supervision Committee (2016) 
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nothing to worry about. As expected, from 2013 to 2016, the CAR has never declined.   
This shows that China’s MPP is very conservative, and it is trying to increase 
the ability of banks to take risks. The continuous rise in capital adequacy ratio, even 
considering the continuous expansion of the bank size, will also affect the bank's 
credit supply capacity. Therefore, after China began to implement MPP in 2009, the 
banks increased their CAR and reduced its credit supply capacity in order to meet the 
requirements of the central bank of China, resulting in a reduction in the volume of 
credit since 2009.  
However, there are some benefits of appearance of MMP. As we mentioned 
earlier, during the period from 2008 to 2009, the reserve requirement for deposits 
increased, but there was no change in interest rates, however, considering the time lag 
in monetary policy, we find that there is a big drop in interest rates from 2007 to 2008. 
In this case, deposit reserve requirement increased, and interest rate decreased, these 
can explain why the credit volume will increase so dramatically in 2009.  
Fig. 4.7 Provision Coverage Ratio from 2009 to 2016 in China 
 
 Source: Bank of China Insurance Supervision Committee (2016) 
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Provision coverage ratio is one of the tools of MPP. Provision coverage ratio 
represents the ability of commercial banks to bear NPL, but higher provision coverage 
means more funds are idle and banks are not allowed to use these funds. This will 
affect commercial banks’ profitability and credit supply capacity because commercial 
banks need to spend more funds to prepare for bad loans. 
 In addition, when the profitability of banks declines, banks will be more cautious 
when they issue loans, which also has a negative effect on the volume of credit. In this 
section, we will describe the level of provision coverage ratio of Chinese banking 
sector from 2009 to 2016.  
Through Fig 4.7, we found that the change in trend of provision coverage ratio is 
similar to the change in trend of the deposit reserve ratio. The only difference is that 
the peak of the deposit reserve ratio is in 2011, and the peak of provision coverage is 
in 2012. 
So far, we have introduced the usage of tool of MP and two tools of MPP. 
Although their role is different, but all of them will affect volume of credit. In the next 
section, we will associate them together to study interaction of China’s MPP and MP. 
4.4 Analysis of Interaction of Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy in 
China 
We have observed three policy tools which can affect the credit supply capacity 
of commercial banks. These are the deposit reserve ratio which is MP tool, and the 
CAR and provision coverage ratio which are the MPP tools. In addition, we have 
introduced interest rate, it is a important indicators of MP. 
Their goals are different. Firstly, the main objective of the deposit reserve ratio 
is to ensure commercial banks' solvency and reduce credit risks, and interest rate 
changes the willingness of people to demand loans by changing the costs (debt burden) 
of loans, thus, changing the volume of granted credit. The main objective of the CAR 
is to ensure that commercial banks are able to bear the risks and losses themselves. 
The main objective of the provision coverage ratio is to ensure that commercial banks 
can withstand the losses caused by non-performing loans. 
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 However, these tools still have some intersections, because whether it is to 
increase the ability to repay debt or to bear the loss, it will cost money and make 
banks more cautions that will affect the volume of credit. 
When we analyze these three tools and interest rate separately, we can observe 
that after the financial crisis, in order to stimulate economic recovery, the Central 
Bank adopted a lower reserve requirement ratio and achieved results. The volume of 
credit has increased year by year. However, in 2009, the deposit reserve ratio did not 
reach the highest value, and still there was a sudden drop in the size of credit.  
After that, the deposit reserve ratio has declined year by year, it is in line with 
the cyclical nature of finance. In terms of MPP, capital adequacy ratios have been 
rising since their implementation in 2009, except in 2013 when the calculation 
method changed. The provision coverage ratio, which has a similar trend with the 
deposit reserve ratio, rose first and then declined, and peaked in 2012. 
So why did the volume of credit suddenly rise in 2009? This is because in 2009, 
Chinese economy has not yet recovered from the financial crisis of 2007. In 2009, 
China just started to implement MPP. This policy gives investor confidence, investors 
are believed that the ability of taking risks of financial institutions have increased, and 
people are more willing to use loans to invest. However, due to MPP and MP have 
adopted contractionary policies and excessive expansion of credit has led to deflation, 
for China, excessive credit expansion is the main reason (Yi, 2013). 
From 2009 to 2011, both MP and MPP in order to control the volume of credit. 
So, deposit reserve ratio, interest rate, CAR and provision coverage, they were 
adjusted in order to reduce the credit volume, and all of these is contractionary policy, 
they will limit the rise of price level. As a result, deflation has disappeared, and the 
volume of credit has declined. 
     After 2012, the deposit reserve ratio and the provision coverage ratio began to 
decline. The burden on banks was reduced, and the banks’ credit supply capacity was 
supposed to improve. The actual situation was indeed the same, and the credit volume 
did increase, but the speed of rise in percentage is lower than the period before 2009. 
This is because of the existence of capital adequacy ratio, unlike other tools, CAR has 
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never been reduced between 2009 and 2016, except changes in measurement methods 
in 2013. This effectively limits the ability of commercial banks to expand and 
prevents them from excessively issuing loans. 
We show in Fig. 4.6 that CAR has been rising since 2009, except the year 2013. 
This limited the bank’s credit supply capacity. Although the deposit reserve ratio and 
provision coverage ratio have been declining during this period, due to the 
cooperation of capital adequacy ratio, the growth of credit volume has been very 
stable, there was no such a rapid growth as in 2008 and 2009. 
     This is due to the cooperation between MPP and MP, which perfectly 
guarantees the stable growth of credit volume and increases the bank's ability to resist 
risks. 
Since China has been implementing the MPP for just nine years, there is very 
little information that can be taken. However, based on the analysis, we show that in 
China, the cooperation between macroprudential policies and monetary policies has 
been a problem in the past, but after the formation of the MPA system in2011, the 
cooperation between MPP and monetary policies has become more complete. Tab. 4.2 
summarizes the provided information about interaction between MP and MPP. 
Now we summarize the results of our analysis. In Tab. 4.2, it shows us the 
situation of MMP and MP from 2008 to 2016 in China. And about inflation rate, there 
are the lowest and highest values of inflation rate of each period, and we judge 
whether the policy goal is achieved based on whether the inflation rate meets the 
requirements or not, as we know, the ideal inflation rate is from 2% to 3% in China.   
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Tab. 4.2 Interaction between Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Policy in China 
 2008-2009 
Expansionary 
or 
Contractionary 
2009-2011 
Expansionary 
or 
Contractionary 
2012-2016 
Expansionary or 
Contractionary 
 
MP 
Deposit 
reserve 
ratio 
Increased Contractionary Increased 
 
Contractionary Decreased Expansionary  
Interest 
rate 
No change Contractionary Increased Contractionary Decreased Expansionary  
MPP 
Capital 
adequacy 
ratio 
Increased Contractionary Increased 
 
Contractionary Increased Contractionary  
Provision 
coverage 
Increased Contractionary Increased 
 
Contractionary Decreased Expansionary  
Result 
Credit 
volume 
Increased Decreased Increased  
Inflation 
rate 
Decreased (-0.7%, 5.9%) Increased (-0.7%, 5.4%) Decreased (2%, 2.6%)  
Target of policies Failure Failure Fulfill  
 Source: Self-elaboration    
We can find in 2009, when China first started implementing MPP, the 
cooperation between MP and MPP was not good. In 2009, China adopted 
contractionary MP and MPP. Although the credit volume has increased a lot, but the 
growth rate is too fast, which is not conducive to the prevention of systemic risks and 
has not reached the target inflation rate.  
Next, from 2009 to 2011, China still adopted contractionary MP and MPP, and 
it has limited the ability of commercial banks to provide credit, thereby reducing the 
volume of credit. Although deflation disappeared, but the inflation rate exceeded the 
ideal value again. Policy target still have not been achieved. After 2011, China 
adopted an expansionary MP, which reduce the deposit reserve ratio and interest rate.  
About MPP, it adopted contractionary CAR and expansionary provision 
coverage ratio. Such a portfolio of policies has not only improved the volume of 
credit, and the growth rate of the credit volume is kept at a stable level, it is no longer 
as fast as during the period from 2008 to 2009. The most important thing is that 
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during this period, China's inflation rate target has been achieved and it has remained 
between 2% and 2.6%.  
Therefore, for China, the direction of MP and MMP cannot be exactly the same, 
that is, they cannot all be expansionary, nor they all be contractionary. They should 
restrict each other and limit each other. For example, in order to ensure that the 
volume of credit will increase, and the growth rate cannot be excessive, central bank 
of China should adopt an expansionary MP, but at the same time, central bank of 
China must also use contractionary MPP tools to limit the growth of credit volume.  
When they are in the same direction, they often have bad results. As in 2008 
and 2011, the inflation rate has not reached the target, but after 2011, the inflation rate 
has been very healthy. 
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5 Conclusion 
After the conducted analysis, we have learned about MPP and MP, and their 
interaction in China. The objective of this thesis was to make the assessment of the 
interaction between China's MPP and MP from 2007 to 2016 by using the related 
economic data and policy indicators. 
 The first chapter introduces the selected topic. In this chapter we wrote the 
objective of this thesis and the structures of this thesis. 
    In the second chapter, we learned about the main objective of MPP, as well as 
MP's major objectives. We also learned about MPP tools and MP tools. In addition, in 
the second chapter, we provided the definition of systemic risk. 
In chapter three, we understand some of the interaction between MP and MPP. We 
understand that if used improperly, they will conflict with each other. 
In chapter four, we introduced China’s MPP and MP, especially the double-pillar 
framework which proposed in 2017.We also learned about the development of MPP 
in China, China’s steady MP, and MPA.  
In the chapter five, we made the conclusion of the whole thesis and wrote we 
had learned from this thesis.  
     Through research, we found that there is such an interaction between the MPP 
and MP in China:  
When their direction is the same, MPP will hinder the achievement of MP 
target, that is, inflation rates. For example, from 2008 to 2011, MPP and MP adopted   
contractionary policy, which led to large fluctuations in inflation and the appearance 
of deflation. When they are in different directions, MPP will not only not hinder MP 
but will also help stabilize the inflation rate at very healthy level, Because we can find 
that after 2011, China's inflation rate is very stable, below 3%. 
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Annex 1: Macroeconomic Situation of China 
 Inflation rate Total size of credit (100 million yuan) 
2007 4.80% 36323 
2008 5.90% 49041 
2009 -0.70% 95942 
2010 3.30% 79451 
2011 5.40% 74715 
2012 2.60% 82038 
2013 2.60% 88916 
2014 2.00% 97452 
2015 1.40% 112693 
2016 2.00% 124372 
Source: The World Bank (2016) 
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Annex 2: Monetary Policy Tools. 
 Interest Rate deposit reserve ratio 
2007 7.83% 14.50% 
2008 5.94% 15.50% 
2009 5.94% 16.00% 
2010 6.40% 18.50% 
2011 7.05% 21.00% 
2012 6.55% 20.00% 
2013 6.55% 20.00% 
2014 6.15% 20.00% 
2015 4.90% 17.00% 
2016 4.90% 16.50% 
Source：The People’s Bank of China (2016) 
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Annex 3: Macroprodential Tools. 
 Adequacy ratio Provision coverage 
2009 11.40% 155% 
2010 12.20% 218.30% 
2011 12.70% 278.10% 
2012 13.25% 295.51% 
2013 12.19% 282.70% 
2014 13.18% 232.06% 
2015 13.45% 181.18% 
2016 14.230% 162.61% 
Source: Bank of China Insurance Supervision Committee (2016) 
 
 
 
